For most lawful permanent residents, returning to the United States after a trip abroad is routine. You present your green card, the officer checks it, and you walk through. The Immigration and Nationality Act reflects that reality: it states that a returning lawful permanent resident “shall not be regarded as seeking an admission” into the United States. You are coming home, not applying for entry.
But that protection has exceptions, and on June 23, 2026, the United States Supreme Court decided how easily the government can invoke the most consequential of them. In Blanche v. Lau, No. 25-429, the Court held, 6-3, that a border officer does not need clear and convincing evidence that a returning green card holder has committed a disqualifying crime before treating that resident as an applicant for admission. A pending charge — not a conviction, not proof — can be enough for the officer to act at the border. The government’s evidentiary burden comes later, at the removal hearing.
If you are a lawful permanent resident with any pending criminal matter, this decision converts what was an open question into settled law: international travel now carries a confirmed, concrete risk. Here is what the Court decided, why the dissent called it “a massive blank check,” and what it means for you.
Two Legal Roads — and Why the Difference Is Enormous
To understand why Blanche v. Lau matters, it helps to know that immigration law provides two separate frameworks for removing a non-citizen from the United States.
The first is deportation under INA § 237. This is the standard track for lawful permanent residents. Under this framework, the government bears the burden of proving — by clear and convincing evidence — that the resident has committed an offense that makes them deportable. The resident is presumed to be a lawful member of the community until the government proves otherwise. Defenses and forms of relief, including cancellation of removal, are available.
The second is inadmissibility under INA § 212. This framework applies to people seeking admission — people who have not yet been formally admitted to the country. Here the burden shifts to the non-citizen to prove they are eligible to enter. The government does not have to prove you are removable; you have to prove you are admissible. Some defenses change as well. Cancellation of removal for long-term permanent residents remains available in principle on either track, but its seven-year residence clock stops on the date the offense was committed, and that rule defeats many residents with an old offense.
A long-term lawful permanent resident placed on the deportation track has real defenses. The same person placed on the inadmissibility track faces a fundamentally different — and harder — fight. The question in Blanche v. Lau was about which track the government is allowed to use, and how much proof it needs at the border to choose the harder one.
What Happened to Muk Choi Lau
Muk Choi Lau, a Chinese citizen, became a lawful permanent resident in 2007. On May 7, 2012, New Jersey charged him with trademark counterfeiting — selling nearly $300,000 worth of counterfeit merchandise. He had not been convicted; the case was pending.
While awaiting trial, Lau traveled to China. On June 15, 2012, he returned through the airport and presented his green card. The officer found the pending charge through a database match. Rather than admitting him as a returning resident, the officer paroled him into the country for deferred inspection — placing him in the legal posture of an arriving alien rather than a returning resident.
Lau pleaded guilty to the New Jersey charge on June 24, 2013. On March 13, 2014, the government initiated removal proceedings — on inadmissibility grounds under § 212, not deportability grounds under § 237. The immigration judge ordered him removed, and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed.
In March 2025, the Second Circuit vacated the removal order. It acknowledged that a resident may be regarded as seeking admission after committing a crime involving moral turpitude even without a conviction — but held that the border officer needed clear and convincing evidence of a committed offense at the time of reentry. A pending charge alone was not enough. The court ordered the inadmissibility proceedings terminated, without prejudice to the government charging Lau with deportability based on his now-existing conviction. Because the Second Circuit’s rule conflicted with decisions of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, the Supreme Court took the case.
What the Supreme Court Held
Justice Thomas, writing for six Justices (Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined), vacated the Second Circuit’s decision. The holding is direct: “We conclude that the Government properly charged Lau with inadmissibility. Border officers did not have the burden to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Lau had committed a crime involving moral turpitude.” Blanche v. Lau, No. 25-429, slip op. at 9 (U.S. June 23, 2026).
Three points carry the weight of the opinion.
The border is not a courtroom. The clear-and-convincing standard the Second Circuit imposed comes from Board of Immigration Appeals precedent that governs the removal hearing, not the border encounter. In Matter of Valenzuela-Felix, 26 I&N Dec. 53, 57, 64 (BIA 2012), the Board placed the government’s burden “at the time of the removal hearing” — and at Lau’s hearing, the government met it: his guilty plea was clear and convincing evidence that he had committed the crime before he attempted to reenter. The Court declined to add a second, earlier burden on border officers “entrusted with making ‘quick judgments on the spot,'” slip op. at 7 (quoting Luz Munoz v. Holder, 755 F.3d 366, 371 (5th Cir. 2014)), when no such burden appears in the statute.
“Committed” does not mean “convicted.” The statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v), lets the government regard a returning resident as seeking admission if he “has committed” a qualifying offense — and the Court read that word literally. The government may treat a resident as seeking admission as soon as he “committed a” crime involving moral turpitude “even if (as in [Lau’s] case) the conviction occurred” later. Slip op. at 9 (quoting Barton v. Barr, 590 U.S. 222, 232 (2020)). Rejecting the argument that a conviction is required, Justice Thomas was blunt: “One does not commit a conviction.” Slip op. at 9.
The proof comes later. The decision does not eliminate the government’s burden — it locates it at the removal hearing, where the government must still establish, on the evidence produced there, that the resident committed the disqualifying offense. What the officer at the border needs is far less: enough to treat the returning resident as an applicant for admission and parole him in while the case is assembled.
The Dissent: “A Massive Blank Check”
Justice Jackson, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, wrote a dissent nearly twice the length of the majority opinion. Its core warning is about what the border officer’s judgment now rests on — and what the resident loses the moment it is made.
“A demotion to the status of ‘seeking an admission’ is not costless,” she wrote. “Quite to the contrary, it comes with significant deprivations.” Blanche v. Lau, No. 25-429, slip op. at 8 (Jackson, J., dissenting). The resident loses the procedural footing of an admitted person: the burden flips, and relief that would be available on the deportation track falls away.
On the majority’s reading of “committed,” Justice Jackson invoked first principles: “It is a fundamental maxim in our country that all are innocent until proven guilty.” Slip op. at 17 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Lau’s indictment alone, she argued, could not establish that he had “committed” anything.
And her closing concern is the one every permanent resident should read twice: “I worry that the Court has now handed the Government a massive blank check.” Slip op. at 17 (Jackson, J., dissenting). A border officer who concludes — on a database hit, on a pending charge, on evidence no court has tested — that a returning resident “has committed” a qualifying crime may now reroute that resident onto the harder track, and the check on that judgment comes only later, at a hearing where the resident already stands demoted.
What This Means for Lawful Permanent Residents Now
Before June 23, 2026, this risk was an open question that prudent travelers planned around. It is now confirmed law.
If you are a lawful permanent resident with any pending criminal matter — an open charge, a deferred prosecution, a matter under investigation — the decision to travel internationally is an immigration decision, not just a personal one. You need legal advice before you go.
A pending charge alone can now support the government’s decision to parole you at the border and pursue removal on the inadmissibility track when you return. The government does not need to prove anything to the border officer’s satisfaction beyond what the statute itself requires, and the Supreme Court has held that the statute requires very little at that moment. The stakes of that inspection have risen: the Board is now publishing precedents denying cancellation to long-time residents.
This is not a hypothetical concern for Montana residents. Lawful permanent residents working in agriculture and other industries, people with older matters they consider resolved, and long-term green card holders who have never had reason to think carefully about their immigration status are all potentially affected. A conviction that an immigration attorney might successfully manage in deportation proceedings becomes a much harder problem when the government can pursue it on the inadmissibility track instead — and Blanche v. Lau confirms that your own trip abroad is what hands the government that option.
It is also worth remembering that even a minor conviction — one that would carry no immigration consequence for a permanent resident who stays put — can create real complications at the border when a green card holder returns from international travel. We covered the day-to-day obligations that come with permanent residence, including the risks that travel creates, in our guide to keeping your green card. Blanche v. Lau sits at the intersection of that body of law and the specific vulnerability that international travel creates — and the intersection just became more dangerous.
What to Do
If you are a lawful permanent resident with any pending criminal matter, do not assume that travel will be routine, and do not assume that an unresolved charge is invisible. Database checks at ports of entry surface pending state charges, as Lau’s case shows. Consult an immigration attorney before you book the flight. The conversation is short; the consequences of skipping it can be severe and, after this decision, largely beyond challenge. If you are already back and facing an inadmissibility charge, a § 212(h) waiver can sometimes be requested before the immigration judge.
Immigration Law of Montana has represented lawful permanent residents facing removal proceedings for nearly twenty-five years, including cases involving the criminal grounds of removal and the interaction between pending charges and immigration status. If you have questions about how a criminal matter — resolved or pending — may affect your ability to travel and return, contact our removal defense practice before you travel.
This post analyzes the Supreme Court’s decision in Blanche v. Lau, No. 25-429 (U.S. June 23, 2026). It is for general informational purposes and does not constitute legal advice. Consult a qualified immigration attorney regarding your individual circumstances.
